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Should Courts Impose RICO's Pretrial Restraint Measures
on Substitute Assets?
James M. Rosenthal
INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RIC0)1 in 1970 to curb the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business, it resurrected an old common law punishment: in personam asset forfeiture.2 As originally
enacted, RICO mandated that upon conviction a defendant had to
forfeit all of his assets that were "tainted" by a connection with the
crime.3 Any proceeds derived from or involved with the racketeering activity would be deemed tainted and thus potentially forfeit1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO), Pub. L No. 91-452, §§ 1961-68, 84 Stat.
922, 941, 943. For background information on RICO, see Tracey Doherty et al., Project,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 769 (1994). For additional but somewhat outdated background on RICO, see G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal
and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980). Blakey and Gettings provide an especially
comprehensive analysis of the legislative history surrounding RICO's enactment in 1970. Id.
at 1014-21. Their insight is particularly valuable because they both had substantial involvement in the drafting of RICO. Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures at the time RICO was enacted, and Gettings was Counsel and
Director of the House Republican Conference Task Force on Crime during the period in
which RICO's legislative precursors were considered.
2. For a discussion of the historical developments in forfeiture law, see Craig W. Palm,
RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 1, 6-13 (1991) and Michael Todd King, Note, Expanding the Courts' Power to Preserve
Forfeitable Assets: The Pretrial Restraint of Substitute Assets Under RICO and CCE, 29 GA.
L. REV. 245, 247-50 (1994).
The use of forfeiture as a criminal sanction has its roots in ancient Greek, Roman, and
Judaic law. See Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due
Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1009, 1009 n.2 (1990).
Although in personam forfeitures were relatively frequent at early common law, they essentially disappeared as a form of punishment in American courts during the nineteenth century,
until readopted by RICO in 1970. See Palm, supra, at 10-11.
There are two types of forfeiture orders: in personam and in rem. In personam forfeiture
actions are imposed on the defendant as a form of punishment The defendant must first be
convicted of a crime before forfeiture may be ordered. In rem forfeiture, on the other hand,
involves a proceeding against the property itself, and thus does not require a conviction as a
predicate event. RICO's forfeiture provisions are in personam, since they are entered against
the defendant only after a conviction. Id. at 6-7.
3. The original RICO forfeiture provision provided that upon conviction, a defendant:
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which
he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 1962.
RICO,§ 1963(a), 84 Stat 922, 943 (amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,
ch. 3, sec. 302, § 1963(a), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040).
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able upon a :finding of guilt. For example, if an individual earned
ten thousand dollars from his participation in racketeering and subsequently used the funds to purchase an automobile, it would be
subject to forfeiture upon conviction as tainted property. Moreover, in order to ensure that the defendant's property would be obtainable in the event of a forfeiture order, RICO included a limited
pretrial restraint provision permitting courts to enter restraining orders against assets potentially subject to forfeiture.4
In the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act {CFA) of 1984,s Congress
significantly amended RICO's forfeiture section in an effort to bolster the war against organized crime by attacking its economic base.
In the CFA, Congress responded to concerns that prosecutors underutilized RICO's forfeiture provisions.6 A principal feature of
this attempt to promote the use of asset forfeiture was the expansion of RICO's pretrial restraint powers. Before the 1984 Act,
courts could order restraints only after the filing of an indictment or
information.1 Because defendants were often aware of potential
RICO prosecutions before formal charges were brought, they were
usually able to protect their tainted assets from forfeiture by concealing them from the court.8 Congress addressed this problem in
1984 by amending RICO's pretrial restraint provision to permit the
imposition of restraints before an indictment or information.9
4. RICO originally pennitted district courts "to enter restraining orders or prohibitions,
or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory
perfonnance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture
under this section, as it shall deem proper." RICO,§ 1963(b), 84 Stat. 922, 943 (amended by
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, ch. 3, sec. 302, § 1963(b), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat 1837, 2040-41; current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1984)).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963).
6. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374. The Senate report discusses a 1981 General Accounting Office study that attributed
the underutilization problem in large measure to the forfeiture provisions' numerous limita·
tions. Id. The report asserts that "[t]his bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations
and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement
agencies." Id. at 3375; see also United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the limitations inherent in RICO's original forfeiture provisions).
7. In the federal system, an indictment by grand jury is required before any felony prosecution. Infonnations are filed as an alternative charging instrument where the defendant has
waived his right to a grand jury. The primary difference between an indictment and an information is its source. Grand juries issue indictments, but infonnations are issued by a prosecutor. See generally WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25
(2d ed. 1992).
8. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 202, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3385; see
also Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1488-89 (attributing the ineffectiveness of RICO's forfeiture sanctions during the 1970s in large measure to the government's policy of routinely notifying
defendants of pending grand jury investigations, which enabled such individuals to transfer or
conceal assets before an indictment was returned).
9. RICO's pretrial restraint provision has remained substantially unchanged since the
1984 Act. The 1984 amendment was enacted as subsection (e), but in 1986 Congress
redesignated it as subsection (d). See Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendment
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1\vo years later, Congress again amended RICO to provide for
the forfeiture of assets unconnected with the RICO offense when
the defendant's tainted assets are unavailable.10 For instance, a person convicted of a racketeering offense may have purchased a home
years before the crime took place with money earned from a legitimate job. Under the so-called substitute asset provision, such property is available for forfeiture when assets directly tainted by the
crime are unavailable at the time of conviction. As with the 1984
expansion of pretrial restraints, this substitute asset provision
sought to strengthen RICO's forfeiture powers by enabling courts
to enter forfeiture orders even when the defendant had successfully
concealed his tainted assets.
Although it is clear that substitute assets are forfeitable after
conviction, there is considerable uncertainty in the federal courts
about whether substitute assets may be subjected to pretrial restraint. RICO's pretrial restraint provision explicitly applies to
tainted property, but it is silent regarding substitute assets.11 Both
the Second12 and Fourth13 Circuits have ruled that RICO's pretrial
restraint measures may be applied to substitute assets. The Third
Circuit has disagreed, refusing to apply RICO's pretrial restraint
provision to substitute assets.14
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, sec. 23(3), § 1963, 100 Stat 3592, 3597. This Note shall refer
to the pretrial restraint provision by its current location, subsection (d).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988). The substitute asset provision was originally enacted in
subsection (n), but two years later Congress redesignated it as subsection (m). See AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 7034(b), § 1963(d), 102 Stat. 4181, 4398.
As with the pretrial restraint provision, this Note shall refer to the substitute asset provision
by its current location, subsection (m).
11. Section 1963(d)(l) permits courts to "take ••. action to preserve the availability of
property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). Subsection (a) describes tainted property. See infra text accompanying note 26 for the text of subsection (a).
12. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 {2d Cir. 1988). In remanding consideration of a restraining order to the district court, the Second Circuit advised that if the nature
of the defendant's potentially forfeitable property was such that the entry of pretrial restraints would prove burdensome on third parties, the district court could restrain substitute
assets instead.
13. See In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney
v. United States, 500 U.S. 952 (1991). In Billman, the defendant had transferred $22,000,000
earned in violation of RICO to a Swiss bank account and then fled the country shortly before
the grand jury returned an indictment against him. While out of the country, the defendant
transferred approximately $500,000 to a third party in the United States. After uncovering
evidence of this transfer, the government sought a restraining order on the $500,000. Because the government was unable to prove that the transferred funds were actually RICO
proceeds, the district court, and the Fourth Circuit on appeal, assumed that the money was
not connected with the defendant's illegal conduct The Fourth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the restraint was permissible.
14. See In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993). Martin arose from the
government's investigation of certain schemes to evade excise taxes on diesel fuel in violation
of RICO. Concerned that the targets of the investigation would transfer or conceal potentially forfeitable assets, the government successfully sought the entry of various preindictment restraining orders, claiming that there was in excess of $15,000,000 in forfeitable
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A similar controversy about the propriety of the pretrial restraint of substitute assets has arisen under the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute (CCE).15 The forfeiture provisions of the CCE
are essentially identical to those of RICQ.16 As with RICO, federal
courts disagree as to whether the CCE's pretrial restraint measures
extend to substitute assets. The Fifth17 and Ninthls Circuits have
held that the statute's pretrial restraint provision does not reach
substitute assets.19 By contrast, several district courts in other circuits have permitted the application of the CCE's pretrial restraint
measures to substitute property.2 0 Because courts generally treat
proceeds. The subsequent indictment, however, alleged that only $6,000,000 were forfeitable
profits. The difference between these sums thus had no demonstrated connection to the
RICO offense and was deemed to be substitute assets. The Martin court concluded that
restraints could not be entered on the portion of the money that had no known connection
with the illegal activity. 1 F.3d at 1362.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 848 {1988). The forfeiture provisions of the CCE are found in 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (1988). The forfeiture section of the CCE is also used for the crimes for which forfeiture is authorized by the United States' general criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982
(1982). Section 982 incorporates by reference § 853.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing
that "[t]he provisions of§ 853 are substantially identical to RICO's criminal forfeiture provisions found at 18 U.S.C. § 1963"); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 n.2
(E.D. Va. 1986) (concluding that "18 U.S.C. § 1963 is ••• a mirror of 21 U.S.C. § 853"); S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 209, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3392 (noting that the
1984 amendments to the CCE's forfeiture provisions are "in nearly all respects, identical to
the RICO criminal forfeiture statute as amended"). The CCE's tainted assets provision is
found at§ 853(a); its pretrial restraint measures are found at§ 853(e); and its substitute asset
provision lies at§ 853(p). The principal difference between the RICO and CCE statutes is
that only the CCE statute has a rebuttable presumption provision, which requires the government to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard to obtain a forfeiture. See United
States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 696 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing this difference). This distinction is not relevant to this Note's discussion of pretrial restraint powers.
17. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1993). In Floyd, the defendant,
a former bank president, conspired to loan a total of $1,960,000 to a real estate developer in
exchange for a $450,000 payoff. The loans exceeded the bank's lending limits, and in an
attempt to keep these loans secret, the defendant violated several other banking laws. Upon
the issuance of an indictment, the government sought the entry of CCE's § 853(e)(l)(A)
restraints for up to $1,960,000, claiming that this amount would be subject to forfeiture in the
event of a conviction. The government acknowledged that the defendant did not actually
have the tainted $1,960,000 in his possession and that the restrained money would be substitute assets. The district court agreed that it could impose pretrial restraints on substitute
assets but limited its restraining order to the $450,000, because it was not convinced that the
full $1,960,000 would be forfeitable upon conviction. 992 F.2d at 499. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court's order.
18. See Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 363. In Ripinsky, the government sought a restraining order
of over $1,000,000 against of the defendant who was facing prosecution for fraudulent activities. It was undisputed that the money in question had no connection to the illegal conduct.
The Nmth Circuit denied the request.
19. In addition, one district court in the Eighth Circuit has declined to extend § 853's
pretrial restraint powers to substitute assets. See United States v. Field, 867 F. Supp. 869, 873
(D. Minn. 1994).
20. See United States v. O'Brien, 836 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D. Ohio 1993); United States v.
Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1993); United States v. Swank Corp., 797 F. Supp. 497,
500-502 (E.D. Va. 1993); United States v. Skiles, 715 F. Supp. 1567, 1568 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In
addition, a magistrate in the eastern district of Wisconsin has permitted the imposition of
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the forfeiture provisions of RICO and the CCE as interchangeable,21 this Note relies on the case law of both statutes; for the sake
of simplicity, however, its discussion is limited to whether courts
may order the pretrial restraint of substitute assets under RIC0.22
This Note argues that courts should not apply RICO's pretrial
restraint measures to substitute assets. Part I examines the text of
RICO's forfeiture provisions in light of recent rulings by the
Supreme Court providing guidance in interpreting the statute. Part
I concludes that the statute's plain meaning limits pretrial restraint
measures to tainted assets. Part II examines language in the legislative history of an earlier attempt to add a substitute asset provision
to RICO and in the 1984 change from broad to specific language in
the pretrial restraint provision. From this language, Part II concludes that Congress did not intend for the pretrial restraint provision to apply to substitute assets. Finally, Part Ill examines the
difference between tainted and substitute assets in light of the
greater concern for defendants' property rights that is manifested in
the earlier stages of RICO prosecutions. Part III contends that the
potential hardships associated with restraining orders and the risk
of erroneous deprivation are good reasons for differentiating between tainted and substitute assets for purposes of pretrial restraints. This Note concludes that when a court finds that a portion
of a defendant's tainted assets is unavailable before trial, it should
not try to compensate for this missing sum.by restraining substitute
assets.
·

§ 853's pretrial restraint measures upon substitute assets. See United States v. Schmitz, 153
F.R.D. 136, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
21. RICO and the CCE were both originally enacted as part of the same bill in 1970. See
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 943. In 1984, the
CFA amended § 853 in the same fashion as § 1963. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 413, § 853, 98 Stat. 1837, 2044-45. In fact, § 853's legislative
history incorporates § 1963's legislative record. In discussing the amendments to § 853's pretrial restraint provisions, the 1984 Senate report refers the reader to the discussion of RICO's
pretrial restraint measures. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 213, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3396. Consequently, courts and commentators treat forfeiture issues arising
under RICO and the CCE as interchangeable. See, e.g., Ripins_ky, 20 F.3d at 362 n.3 (asserting that "[w]e therefore refer to cases and legislative history discussing § 1963 and § 853
interchangeably"); In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1358 (3d Cir. 1993) (treating cases dealing with
RICO's forfeiture provisions as relevant precedent for an issue arising under § 853); In re
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, 864 F. Supp. 527, 532 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that it is
settled that "decisions interpreting the RICO forfeiture provisions are persuasive authority
on the interpretation and application of§ 853"); Palm, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 ("[T]he judicial
decisions concerning forfeiture under the CCE are generally instructive with respect to the
counterpart provisions in RICO.").
22. Given the similarities between § 1963 and § 853, the conclusions this Note reaches
with regard to RICO should logically apply to the CCE's forfeiture provisions as well.
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I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF RICO'S FORFEITURE PROVISIONS

The Supreme Court has held that construction of RICO, like
construction of other statutes, should begin by looking at the language of the statute.23 Unambiguous language is conclusive in the
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary,24
This Part examines the statutory language of RICO's forfeiture section to determine whether courts may enter restraining orders
against substitute property. Section I.A focuses on section 1963(d),
the pretrial restraint provision, and concludes that the wording of
this subsection unambiguously indicates that RICO's pretrial restraint measures do not apply to substitute assets. Section l.B considers the language and structure of the entire forfeiture section to
provide a meaningful context for the specific language of section
1963(d). This section concludes that reading the statute as a whole
confirms the view that section 1963(d) is not designed to apply to
substitute assets. Finally, section I.C argues that RICO's liberal
construction mandate does not alter this statutory analysis. This
Part concludes that the statutory language of section 1963 indicates
that RICO does not provide for the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets.

A. An Examination of RICO's Pretrial Restraint Provision
Section 1963(d), RICO's pretrial restraint provision, states that
a court may enter a restraining order "to preserve the availability of
property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture." 25 Subsection
(a) defines tainted assets and makes no reference to substitute
assets:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962;
(2) any(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962; and
23. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety
Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 {1980)).
24. 452 U.S. at 580.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{d){l) (1988) (emphasis added).
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(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity
or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.26

Substitute assets are defined in subs~ction (m) as any property of
the defendant not already identified as a tainted asset under subsection (a).2 7 Thus, RICO's pretrial restraint measure refers only to
subsection (a) - the tainted asset subsection, not subsection (m)
- the substitute assets subsection. The plain language of this provision therefore appears to preclude the application of pretrial restraints to substitute assets.28
In United States v. Monsanto, 2 9 the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of interpreting forfeiture and restraint provisions
consistently with their plain language. In Monsanto, the district
court had entered a restraining order, as provided by section
853(e)(+)(A) of the CCE, on property the defendant allegedly had
accumulated in the course of narcotics trafficking.30 The defendant
moved to vacate the restraining order so that he could use the frozen funds to retain counsel. He argued that the forfeiture provisions of the CCE should be interpreted to include an exemption for
assets used to pay an attorney. The Court rejected this argument,
emphasizing that nowhere in the CCE's forfeiture section was there
any recognition of an exemption for attorney's fees. 31 In response
to contentions that such a ruling ran counter to Congress's intent,
the Court stressed the plain meaning of the statute and stated that
"the statute, as presently written, cannot be read any other way."32
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
27. In full, subsection (m) reads:
(m) If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission
of the defendant (1~ cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2 has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3 has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty;
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the
value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
28. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993). The Floyd court found
that the statute "plainly states what property may be restrained before trial. Congress made
specific reference to that property described in§ 853(a) [equivalent to section 1963(a)], and
that description does not include substitute assets." 992 F.2d at 502.
29. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
30. 491 U.S. at 602-04.
31. 491 U.S. at 606-14.
32. 491 U.S. at 614. Although the Monsanto Court reached a strong conclusion with respect to the statutory language's plain meaning, the opinion nevertheless seemed to rely on
policy grounds as well. The Court remarked that "[p]ermitting a defendant to use assets for
his private purposes that, under this provision, will become the property of the United States
if a conviction occurs cannot be sanctioned." 491 U.S. at 613. The Fourth Circuit has pointed
to this language as providing support for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See In re
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Likewise, section 1963(d)(l) refers only to tainted assets as property subject to pretrial restraints, and cannot be read any other way.
B. Examining the Statute as a Whole
Examination of the plain meaning of RICO's pretrial restraint
provision is only the first step in determining its meaning; the statute must also be read as a whole to provide a context for the plain
language of section 1963(d).33 RICO's forfeiture provisions, when
read as a whole, reveal that the statute treats tainted assets and
substitute assets as two entirely distinct forms of property.34 When
adding a substitute asset provision to RICO, Congress did not simply amend section 1963(a) to allow for the forfeiture of any other
property in the event that the defendant's tainted funds proved unavailable. Although Congress initially considered such an approach,35 it ultimately decided to add a new subsection detailing
when substitute assets may be forfeited.36
Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney v. United States,
500 U.S. 952 (1991). However, the Billman court's reliance on this language is misplaced.
Monsanto's statement is merely dictum, and the crux of the Court's reasoning is that the
statutory language of § 853 does not specifically provide an exemption for attorneys' fees.
The Monsanto Court discusses policy concerns only as a response to the claim that its reliance on the plain language of the statute produced a result that is contrary to legislative
intent. 491 U.S. at 610, 613. By observing the strong policy reasons for denying the exclusion, the Court strengthens its contention that the plain language of the statute reveals that
Congress intended for the restraint of funds which the defendant seeks to use .to retain
counsel.
33. The Supreme Court has ruled that "a statute is to be read as a whole ..• since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." King v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). See also United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 140 (E.D.
Wis. 1994). See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SunmRLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CoNSTRucnoN § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992) ("A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or
sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or
section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole.").
34. See Graeme W. Bush, The Impact of RICO Forfeiture on Legitimate Business, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 996, 1007 (1990). Bush criticizes the argument that the substitute asset
amendment merely clarified already existing powers under § 1963 by pointing out that this
·notion "disregards the structure of the statute, which distinguishes between the treatment of
subsection (a) assets and substitute assets under subsection (m)." Id. See also United States
v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 365 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting that the statute "distinguishes
between 'forfeitable' and 'substitute' assets").
35. The first time Congress contemplated a substitute asset provision, the proposed
amendment simply created a clause at the end of subsection (a) which permitted courts to
reach any other property of the defendant when the tainted assets were unavailable. See S.
REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 995 (1981). However, the proposed substitute asset
amendments of 1982 and 1984 and the ultimately successful enactment in 1986 all refused to
adopt this approach, instead preferring to add the provision in a distinct subsection.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988); see United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he property described in § 853(a) [equivalent to section 1963(a)] •.• does not
include substitute assets. Congress treated substitute assets in a different section, § 853(p)
[equivalent to section 1963(m)].").
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Moreover, RICO treats tainted and substitute assets differently,
taking a far more cautious approach toward substitute assets.
Whereas tainted assets are automatically forfeitable upon conviction, RICO provides that the substitute asset provision is intended
as only a last-resort measure. Congress could simply have provided
for the forfeiture of an amount of money from the defendant's assets equivalent to that involved in the criminal activity, regardless
of whether the property that would ultimately be forfeited had any
connection with the offense.37 Instead, the statute directs courts
first to order the forfeiture of assets that have some nexus with the
RICO violation.38 Courts may only turn to the substitute asset provision when some or all of this tainted property is unattainable.39
Furthermore, even after the prosecution establishes that some
portion of a defendant's tainted assets is unavailable for forfeiture,
subsection (m) specifies two additional requirements that must be
satisfied before courts may order the forfeiture of substitute assets.
First, one of five conditions precedent must be met. Courts may
invoke subsection (m)'s substitute asset provision only where the
tainted property cannot be located by a reasonably diligent
search,40 is now in the hands of a third party,41 lies beyond the jurisdiction of the court,42 has been substantially diminished in value,43
or has been commingled with other property such that it cannot be
separated without difficulty.44 Thus, only certain justifications for
the failure to reach tainted assets provide adequate grounds for the
forfeiture of substitute assets.
Second, subsection (m) also provides that courts may only order
the forfeiture of substitute assets where an "act or omission of the
37. Such an approach would not be entirely novel, for the Seventh Circuit appears to
advocate a similar theory in United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985). Ginsburg involved a RICO prosecution before the 1986 enactment of a substitute asset provision.
The defendant argued that the United States' interest in forfeiture was limited to the amount
that the defendant still had in his possession upon conviction or that the government bore the
burden of proving that the assets sought for forfeiture were the same as those obtained in
violation of RICO. 773 F.2d at 801. The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments, advancing the following theory:
What the defendant's argument overlooks is the fact that a racketeer who dissipates the
profits or proceeds of his racketeering activity on wine, women, and song has profited
from organized crime to the same extent as if he had put the money in his bank account.
Every dollar that the racketeer derives from illicit activities and then spends on such
items as food, entertainment, college tuition, and charity, is a dollar that should not have
been available for him to spend for those purposes.
773 F.2d at 802.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(l) (1988).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(2) (1988).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(3) (1988).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(4) (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(5) (1988).
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defendant" makes the tainted property unavailable.45 This "act or
omission" requirement presumably indicates that the defendant
must have been a proximate cause of the unavailability of the assets.46 By contrast, the forfeiture of tainted assets is automatic
upon conviction. This limitation of RICO's substitute asset provision is quite significant when one recognizes that the defendant has
already been convicted at this point in the process, and thus there is
no need for the more cautious treatment that is ordinarily accorded
to those merely accused of a crime.47 Consider, for example, the
defendant who is convicted of a RICO offense and owns a house
that is deemed to be tainted under section 1963(a). If a sudden
catastrophe completely destroys this property, and the defendant
was unable to purchase insurance for such an event, the government cannot tum to RICO's substitute asset provision as a means
of compensating for this loss. Even though the defendant has been
found guilty of a racketeering crime, Congress would prefer that
the government be unable to collect the full amount owed to it,
rather than force the defendant to make up the difference out of
untainted funds.
The distinction RICO makes between substitute and tainted assets demonstrates that the tainted asset provision should not be
read as implicitly referring to the substitute asset provision. In
United States v. Schmitz, 48 however, the magistrate judge criticized
other courts that began with the initial assumption that subsection
(a) does not include substitute property.49 Instead, the court in
Schmitz reasoned that the substitute asset provision was designed
to supplement subsection (a).50 The court attributed subsection
'
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
46. Of course, the "act or omission" requirement could be read so broadly that it would
almost always be satisfied. For instance, if tainted assets in the possession of a defendant
were stolen by a third party, one might argue that the defendant "omitted" to protect adequately the property from theft and that therefore the government should be permitted to
seize substitute assets.
Such a broad reading, however, would render meaningless Congress's restriction on the
forfeiture of substitute assets to situations where tainted assets are unavailable due to an "act
or omission" of the defendant, because courts could always trace the unavailability to some
act or omission of the defendant. Given that Congress presumably had good reason for including this restriction, courts should not nullify it by interpreting it too broadly.
47. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of innocence and its impact on preconviction proceedings).
48. 153 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
49. Schmitz cites In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351 (3d. Cir. 1993} and United States v. Floyd, 992
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993) as presuming that the tainted asset provision does not include substitute assets. 153 F.R.D. at 139. In fact, in Floyd, the government was willing to stipulate that
subsection (a) does not also contain substitute assets. 992 F.2d at 501.
50. 153 F.R.D. at 139. The court actually reasoned that the substitute asset provision was
designed to "supplant" the tainted asset provision. Given that both subsections still exist,
subsection (m) clearly did not wholly replace subsection (a); hence, the court's use of "supplant" probably should not be read literally. It makes sense, therefore, to read Schmitz as
arguing that subsection (m) supplemented subsection (a).
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(a)'s failure to mention substitute property to chronology, noting
that subsection (a) was enacted years before the addition of a substitute asset provision.s1 The court concluded that because subsection (m) was intended to supplement subsection (a), any reference
to subsection (a) property necessarily includes substitute assets as
well.
The Schmitz court's argument fails because RICO treats substitute and tainted assets as two entirely separate forms of property.
Nowhere in RICO's forfeiture provisions is there evidence that
Congress intended the substitute asset measure to supplement the
tainted asset subsection. If Congress had designed the 1986 substitute asset amendment to supplement the tainted asset provision, as
Schmitz suggests, it could have simply amended subsection (a) to
provide for a substitute asset clause, as discussed above.s2 In the
alternative, Congress could easily have added language to the substitute asset provision stating that it incorporates subsection (a) by
reference. Instead, Congress drafted. RICO's forfeiture provisions
keeping substitute assets distinct from tainted assets, and the statute
treats the two forms of assets differently.
In purporting to read RICO in its entirety, the court also found
that one of RICO's purposes is to preserve all forfeitable assets and
therefore concluded that the pretrial restraint provision must implicitly include substitute assets. The court reasoned that this preservation purpose authorized the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets, because "[t]o conclude otherwise would eviscerate the intent
of the criminal forfeiture statute."S3 The Fourth Circuit apparently
reached a similar conclusion in In re Billman. s4 In Billman, the
court emphasized that the purpose of RICO's pretrial restraint
measure is the preservation of assets that may ultimately be forfeited upon conviction.ss Much like the court in Schmitz, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that it must read RICO's pretrial restraint
provision as implicitly referring to substitute assets so that "the purpose of§ 1963(d)(l)(A) can be attained."S6
Th.is attempt to read a preservation purpose into RICO's forfeiture provisions in order to permit courts to enter pretrial restraints
against substitute assets cannot overcome the statute's plain language and structure. They reveal an intent to preserve the availability of certain assets for ultimate forfeiture upon conviction. Yet,
51. 153 F.R.D. at 139.
52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
53. 153 F.R.D. at 140.
54. 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney v. United States, 500
U.S. 952 (1991).
55. 915 F.2d at 921.
56. 915 F.2d at 921.
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as the language of subsection {d){l) makes clear, this preservation
intent extends only to tainted assets.57
Moreover, even if it were sensible to read the purpose of section
1963 as preserving all forms of assets for ultimate forfeiture, such a
reading would not authorize courts to allow for the pretrial restraint
of substitute assets. The Court's decision in United States v. Monsanto58 indicates that the plain language of RICO, which limits the
pretrial restraint provision to tainted assets, should prevail over this
perceived purpose of preservation. The Court answered the criticism that its ruling runs counter to the intent of the statute by asserting that "the statute, as presently written, cannot be read any
other way."59 The Court noted that Congress could always amend
the statute so that its plain language would conform to its intended
purposes.60 Likewise, section 1963 can only be read as precluding
the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. If Congress believes that
this reading frustrates a purpose of preservation, it can amend
RICO to provide explicitly for the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets.
C.

The Relevance of RICO's Liberal Construction Mandate

The bill enacting RICO into law stipulated that its forfeiture
provisions were to be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes,"61 and the Supreme Court has agreed that RICO should
be interpreted in this fashion. 62 Several courts have relied upon
this liberal construction mandate in interpreting section 1963 as
permitting the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.63
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(l) (1988).
58. 491 U.S. 600 (1989); see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
59. 491 U.S. at 614.
60. 491 U.S. at 614. For a recent example of a court's emphasizing the plain meaning in
the face of possible policy concerns to the contrary, see In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, 864
F. Supp. 527, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 1994). At issue in Moffitt was whether the court could require
a law firm that had received and spent potentially forfeitable money from a defendant, to
forfeit a sum equal to the amount originally subject to forfeiture. The court acknowledged
that "[t]here is a visceral tendency to give a quick affirmative answer to this question •••
[and] conclude that the Law Firm should be required to pay it back from the Firm's other
assets." 864 F. Supp. at 534-35. Yet the Moffitt court declined to follow this "visceral tendency," reflecting that "[i]f the power is not found in the statute, a court should avoid creating one by implication on policy grounds." 864 F. Supp. at 535. The court feared that by
giving in to this temptation to amend the statute to conform with notions of policy, it would
cross the "line that exists between principled but energetic judicial lawmaking and illegitimate usurpation of the legislative role." 864 F. Supp. at 535.
61. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
62. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S: 16, 27 (1983) (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)). § 853(0) of the CCE provides an identical liberal construction
clause. 21 U.S.C. § 853(0) {1988).'
63. See, e.g., In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 {4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney v. United States, 500 U.S. 952 (1991); United States v. O'Brien, 836 F. Supp. 438, 441
(S.D. Ohio 1993); United States v. Wu, 814 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1993). The Fourth
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These courts, however, have misunderstood the scope of that
mandate. It merely requires courts to resolve any ambiguity in the
forfeiture clause such that the remedial goals of the statute are
served.64 The mandate does not permit courts to amend the statute
by judicial interpretation.65 The Supreme Court recently acknowledged these limits on the liberal construction mandate, ruling that
"[t]his [liberal construction] clause obviously seeks to ensure that
Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of
the statute, but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended. "66
As discussed in section I.A, the language of section 1963(d)(l) is
unambiguous; accordingly, courts need not even consider the liberal
construction mandate. Construing the pretrial restraint measures
of section 1963(d) as only applying to subsection (a) property because the section only refers to that property does not amount to
the "overly narrow reading of the statute" that the liberal construction mandate was intended to avert. Moreover, interpreting section
1963(a), which only mentions tainted assets, as not including substitute assets is reasonable, given that RICO treats tainted assets and
substitute assets very differently.67 Therefore, courts should not use
Circuit, for example, stressed that RICO's remedial purpose requires the preservation of
defendant's assets for forfeiture if he is convicted. In re Billman, 915 F.2d at 921. The
Billman court then simply concluded that given this remedial purpose, it could read RICO's
pretrial restraint provision as implicitly referring to substitute assets as well. 915 F.2d at 921.
This reasoning is similar to, but distinct from, the Billman court's assertion that the preservation purpose of § 1963(d) requires it to read an implicit reference to substitute assets into
RICO's pretrial restraint provision. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. The
Billman court first indicated that this preservation purpose alone allows for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. 915 F.2d at 921. The court then supported this conclusion by
pointing to the liberal construction mandate as additional authorization for the entry of pretrial restraining orders against substitute property. 915 F.2d at 921.
64. The Supreme Court has commented that RICO's liberal construction clause " 'only
serves as an aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.'" Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492
n.10 (1985)); see also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 290 n.150 (1982) ("[I]f RICO's language is
plain, it ought to control; if the language is ambiguous, that construction which would 'effectuate its remedial purposes' ..• ought to be adopted."); Craig W. Palm, Note, RICO and the
Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 191 (1980) (concluding that "words
should be given their plain meaning whenever possible" and that the liberal construction
directive is only intended to guide courts when dealing with ambiguities). See generally Alan
R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 239 ("Even
though interpretive directions may not say so explicitly, they generally operate only to resolve ambiguities in a statute.").
65. See United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "this command for a liberal construction does not authorize us to amend by interpretation").
66. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. at 1172. In Ernst & Young, the Court refused to extend
liability under § 1962(c) of RICO because it read the language and legislative history as indicating that Congress intended to limit liability to those individuals who participate in the
operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. 113 S. Ct. at
1172.
67. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
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the liberal construction mandate to extend RICO's forfeiture powers to allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets - a "new
purpose[ ] that Congress never intended. "68
II. THE

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

1963

This Part examines the legislative history of RICO's forfeiture
provisions to determine whether there is any clearly expressed legislative intent that would permit the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets. Although the substitute asset provision was enacted in 1986
without any accompanying legislative history, Congress considered
adding virtually identical substitute asset provisions to RICO in
1982 and 1984, and useful legislative history accompanies both of
these attempts.69 Section II.A examines the legislative record behind the 1982 effort to add a substitute asset provision and identifies language plainly indicating that the pretrial restraint measures
of RICO were not intended to cover substitute assets. Section II.B
then looks at the 1984 attempt and explains that Congress amended
RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the expectation that there
would be a substitute asset measure as well. Given this expectation,
the 1984 change from nonspecific to very specific language in
RICO's pretrial restraint provision offers additional evidence that
Congress did not plan for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.
This Part concludes that the legislative history offers no indication
of any congressional intent that would justify ignoring the plain language of section 1963. In fact, the record surrounding Congress's
previous efforts to add a substitute asset provision indicates that
Congress specifically intended to limit RICO's pretrial restraint
measures to tainted property.

A. The 1982 Legislative History
Congress considered a series of substantial amendments to
RICO in 1982. Included among these proposed amendments was a
substitute asset provision as well as the modification of RICO's pretrial restraint provision that passed two years later.70 The accompanying committee report explicitly declares that the pretrial restraint
amendment would apply only to tainted assets - assets that were
then described in subsection (a)(2). The report states: "It should
also be noted that the restraining order provision applies only to
(a)(2) property. It may not be applied with respect to other assets
68. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. at 1172. See infra Part II (concluding that the legislative
history suggests that Congress did pot intend for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets).
69. Congress also considered a substitute asset amendment in 1981, but the scant legislative history accompanying this attempt does not shed any light on Congress's views regarding
the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See S. REP. No. 307, supra note 35, at 993-96.
70. See S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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that may ultimately be ordered forfeited under the substitute asset
provision." 71 This statement evinces a clear legislative mandate
that section 1963's pretrial restraint measures should not extend to
substitute assets.12
This mandate, of course, is found Within legislative history for a
bill that Congress did not pass.73 But according to the Supreme
Court, the legislative history of a previous unenacted bill is "wholly
relevant" to an understanding of a later-enacted bill where the language of the two acts is substantially the same.74 Here, the pretrial
restraint and substitute asset provisions considered in 1982 are essentially identical to the measures that eventually passed into law.75
71. Id. at 10 n.18. One court has attempted to discredit this legislative history by noting
that the Senate Report states that RICO's pretrial restraint measures apply only to subsection (a)(2) property, whereas the present provision applies to subsection (a) property. See
United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (E.D. WIS. 1994). This distinction is immaterial. In the amendments to§ 1963 considered in 1982, subsection (a)(2) encompassed almost exactly the same assets that subsection (a) does today. The present version of
subsection (a) describes which forms of property are considered "tainted" and thus forfeitable upon conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). The 1982 version was structured somewhat differently. Subsection (a) was divided into two parts. Subsection (a)(l) set forth the
other possible sanctions that may result from a RICO conviction, and subsection (a)(2) established what constituted "tainted" assets. See S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 23. Thus,
the Senate Report referred to subsection (a)(2), instead of subsection (a), simply because at
that time subsection (a) was formatted in a slightly different fashion.
72. Both the Third and Nmth Circuits have concluded that this statement unequivocally
establishes that Congress did not iiltend for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. See
United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 363-64 {9th Cir. 1994); In re Martin, 1 F.3d 1351,
1359-60 {3d Cir. 1993).
73. See Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. at 140. In attempting to discredit reliance on the 1982 report,
the Schmitz magistrate asserted that the war against crime had escalated in the years following 1982 and concluded that "[i]t is therefore difficult to say that Congress's reasons, concerns and intentions at the time the substitute asset provision was enacted were the same as
in 1982, when Congress declined to enact the provision." 153 F.R.D. at 140.
74. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1973). In discussing the legislative history surrounding the Hobbs Act, the Emnons Court relied upon a statement made by
Congressman Hobbs in introducing an earlier version of the bill that had only passed in the
House of Representatives. The Court stressed that the earlier history was applicable because
"the operative language of the original bill was substantially carried forward into the Act."
410 U.S. at 404 n.14.
75. The 1982 version of the substitute asset provision read in full:
(d) If any of the property described in subsection {a)(2) {l) cannot be located;
(2) has been transferred to, sold to, or deposited with, a third party,
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
(4) has been substantially diminished in value by any act or omission of the defendant, or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty,
.
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the
value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70 at 24. The present version of RICO's substitute asset provision is quoted in full supra in note 27. A comparison of the two provisions reveals that they
are essentially the same, with only two significant differences. First, the current version adds
a due diligence requirement for property that "cannot be located" under subsection {l). Second, the 1982 amendment specifies in subsection (4) that the property must be diminished in
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Accordingly, the 1982 committee report's statement regarding the
limits of RICO's pretrial restraint measure offers strong evidence
that Congress never intended for section 1963's restraints to apply
to substitute assets.76
B.

The 1984 Legislative History

In the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA) of 1984,77 Congress
reconsidered many of the amendments to RICO that were proposed in 1982 but never enacted.78 This time Congress succeeded
in substantially revising RICO's forfeiture provisions. For instance,
Congress greatly expanded the scope of RICO's pretrial restraint
provisions by permitting courts to enter preindictment restraining
orders.79 The CFA also included a substitute asset provision, but
the provision was ultimately eliminated in a different section of the
same act without any explanation in the legislative history.so
value "by any act or omission of the defendant." In the final version, this requirement applies to all of subsection (m). 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
76. The magistrate judge in Schmitz also raised one other rather peculiar argument in
endeavoring to discredit this statement in the 1982 report. The magistrate noted that this
statement falls within a section of text that seems especially concerned with the constitutional
implications of prior restraint measures. 153 F.R.D. at 140. This observation, however, does
not detract from the statement's relevance as pertinent legislative history. First, the court is
probably incorrect in its reading of this supposed context. Schmitz cites pages nine and ten of
the committee report as manifesting a particular sensitivity to constitutional issues. 153
F.R.D. at 140 (citing S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 9-10). Yet on these two pages, the
only conceivable indication of a constitutional concern is that the report devotes a footnote
to listing several cases that consider whether a restraining order is incompatible with the
presumption of innocence. See S. REP. No. 520, supra note 70, at 10 n.19. The report does
not appear to be especially concerned with the implications of this issue, for it subsequently
expresses the view that "pretrial restraining orders for the purpose of preserving assets does
not impinge on the trial concept of a presumption of innocence." Id. at 11.
Furthermore, even if one does read the surrounding text of the committee report as
somehow revealing a concern with the constitutional reach of pretrial restraint measures,
such an interpretation does not diminish the value of the statement as pertinent legislative
history. It is difficult to understand the relevance of this supposed context. Schmitz seems to
be advancing this alleged sensitivity to explain why the committee report explicitly limits the
application of pretrial restraints to tainted property. However, the underlying motivation ls
of little concern here, for such a motivation cannot diminish the strength of a statement
which plainly asserts that RICO's pretrial restraint measures do not apply to substitute assets. It does not matter why Congress decided to restrict RICO's restraint powers to tainted
assets; all that is important is that the legislature, for whatever reason, did not intend for
§ 1963(d) to apply to substitute assets.
77. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040.
78. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing the CFA).
79. This revision of RICO's pretrial restraint powers can now be found, essentially unchanged, at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988).
80. The substitute asset provision was added in chapter three of the 1984 Act by § 302 of
the CFA. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040. In the same Act, however,§ 230l(b) of chapter
23 further amended RICO by striking out the previously added substitute asset provision.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2192. The legislative history accompanying the 1984 Act discusses the substitute asset provision as if it were ultimately enacted and offers no explanation
for why it was eventually withdrawn. No other source has been able to explain why this
subsection was withdrawn. The Seventh Circuit has commented that "[t]he reason for the
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That Congress considered a substitute asset provision at the
same time it substantially revised RICO's pretrial restraint measures suggests that Congress drafted the present-day version of
RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the expectation that RICO
would also include a substitute asset provision. This expectation
affects the interpretation of the legislative history in two ways.
First, it answers the argument that section 1963(d)(l) does not
refer to substitute assets because RICO had no substitute asset provision at the time section 1963(d)(l) was enacted.Bl This argument
proves meritless because Congress drafted the pretrial restraint
amendment under the assumption that a substitute asset provision
would exist as well. In fact, section 1963(d)(l)'s explicit reference
only to tainted property, at a time when Congress presumed the
existence of a substitute asset measure, supports the argument that
Congress did not intend for the pretrial restraint of substitute
assets.
Second, the presumption of a coexisting substitute asset provision is also of particular significance when one compares the
amended version of RICO's pretrial restraint provision with the
original enactment. Although the revised pretrial restraint provision specifies which type of assets may be restrained, the earlier
version merely stated that courts could enter restraints "in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under
this section."82 Tainted assets were the only form of property subject to forfeiture when Congress drafted the original restraining order provision, so there was no need to specify which assets could be
restrained. But Congress amended the pretrial restraint provision
in 1984 with the assumption that there would now be two categories
of forfeitable assets - substitute and tainted - thus creating the
need to identify which type of property was covered. Accordingly,
Congress's decision to change the wording of RICO's pretrial restraint provision from "any property or other interest subject to forfeiture" to "property described in subsection (a)" at the same time
last-minute deletion of what would have been [the substitute asset provision] is unclear."
United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). One congressman, in advocating passage of the substitute asset measure in 1986, noted that the provision was "part of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act when it left this House several years ago and similarly
was passed in the other body. Somehow it got dropped out in conference." 132 CoNG. REc.
22,962 (1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
81. No court has raised this specific argument. But cf. United States v. Schmitz, 153
F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (E.D. Wis. 1994). The court in Schmitz raises a similar chronological
argument in concluding that the substitute asset provision was meant to supplement the
tainted asset provision. The opinion uses the fact that substitute assets were added to § 853
well after the tainted asset provision to explain why the tainted asset provision does not
specifically refer to substitute assets. 153 F.R.D. at 139; see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
82. Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 1098 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)
(1988)).
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that it created another form of property hardly seems coincidental.
This change from nonspecific language to very specific language appears to indicate a conscious choice by Congress to limit RICO's
pretrial restraint measures to tainted funds.

ill.

CONGRESSIONAL REASONS FOR TREATING SUBSTITUTE
ASSETS DIFFERENTLY FROM TAINTED ASSETS

Although the plain statutory language and legislative history of
section 1963 make it clear that Congress did not intend for courts to
apply RICO's pretrial restraint measures to substitute assets, at first
blush, this conclusion seems at odds with RICO's particularly expansive nature. RICO is renowned for its extremely broad application and potentially severe penalties. The Seventh Circuit has
described RICO as a "statute of exceedingly broad scope,"83 and
the Supreme Court has agreed that RICO was "intended to provide
new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized
crime and its economic roots." 84 A recognition of RICO's breadth
seems to motivate those courts that permit the pretrial restraint of
substitute assets. Implicit in these various courts' opinions is a failure to understand why Congress, which historically has worked to
expand RICO to an unprecedented scope, would balk at the notion
of the pretrial restraint of substitute assets.ss
This Part addresses this confusion and explains why it makes
sense for RICO to limit section 1963's pretrial restraint measures to
tainted property. It argues that the greater care that is required for
pretrial impositions on assets unconnected with the illegal activity
justifies the differential treatment RICO gives to substitute assets.86
83. United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985).
84. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983); see also Palm, supra note 2, at 27
("The most striking aspect of RICO's forfeiture provisions is their unprecedented nature and
breadth.").
·
85. Professor Palm has observed that this sensitivity to RICO's broad application does
affect judicial reasoning at times. He notes that the expansive language ofRICO's forfeiture
provisions has sometimes prompted courts to conclude summarily that certain assets.are forfeitable or to ignore whether the forfeiture sought by the prosecution is permitted by any
specific language of § 1963. Palm, supra note 2, at 27-28.
86. But see King, supra note 2. King argues that Congress should amend RICO to provide explicitly for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. King, supra note 2, at 269. He
sees two justifications for the imposition of§ 1963{d) restraints on substitute property. He
asserts that the pretrial restraint of substitute assets would preserve the availability of such
assets for postconviction forfeiture proceedings and would firmly establish the proper court's
jurisdiction over the potentially forfeitable property. Id. at 271-72.
Although King advocates allowing the pretrial restraint of substitute assets, his argument
nonetheless lends support to the notion that there are reasons to limit pretrial restraint powers to tainted property. King acknowledges that the imposition of pretrial restraints on substitute assets could potentially impair the accused's ability to provide for basic living
expenses. Id. at 287-88; see infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (commenting further on
the potential hardships associated with pretrial restraining orders). In fact, he argues that in
amending RICO to allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets, Congress should also
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Section ID.A first notes that Congress expressed greater concern
for defendants' rights at preconviction stages of the trial process. It
then argues that not allowing pretrial restraint of substitute assets is
consistent with RICO's heightened protection of defendants' rights
at the pretrial stage. Section m.B maintains that defendants deserve less protection for their tainted assets because they are not
legally entitled to such ill-gotten gains. Substitute assets, on the
other hand, lack a nexus with the illegal conduct, and thus Congress
had good reason to exercise caution when drafting legislation that
permits the government to restrain substitute assets. This Part concludes that in light of the strict safeguards that Congress imposed
on preconviction proceedings, it is not surprising that the legislature
would refuse to extend RICO's pretrial restraint measures to substitute assets.87
A.

The Importance of Timing in Section 1963: Pre- and
Postconviction Proceedings

The level of procedural protection defendants receive in
RICO's forfeiture proceedings depends in large measure on the
phase of the prosecution in which they fall.BB This disparate treatment of a defendant's assets depending on the phase of the prosecution makes a great deal of sense. It remains a fundamental tenet
of our criminal justice system that the accused is presumed innocent
add a specific description of the hearing process to be used when the government seeks the
extension of restraints on substitute assets beyond the mere ten-day temporary restraint order set forth in§ 1963(d)(2). King, supra note 2, at 283-86; see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (describing the hearing procedure for§ 1963(d)(2) restraints). King calls
for a formalized hearing process because he perceives an inherent potential for abuse in the
pretrial restraint of substitute assets. In addition to affording the court an opportunity to
make allowances for basic living expenses, the hearing is also intended to provide a check
against abuses by the prosecution. King argues that the hearing should ensure that tainted
assets are actually unavailable and that the prosecution has not overstated the value of such
tainted assets or understated the value of the restrained substitute property. King, supra
note 2, at 285-86.
'ir/. The plain language of § 1963, as discussed in Part I, and the relevant legislative history, as discussed in Part II, indicate that RICO does not provide for the pretrial restraint of
substitute assets. Although Congress has made it clear that RICO's pretrial restraint measures are not designed to cover substitute assets, it has never explained the reason for this
result. This Part attempts to fill this void by offering a possible reason. Even if one rejects
the explanation offered in this Part, it does not follow that RICO must then provide for the
pretrial restraint of substitute assets. This Note's conclusion that RICO's pretrial restraint
measures do not apply to substitute assets stands firmly on the plain language and legislative
history alone; Part III merely endeavors to explain why this conclusion makes sense.
88. See Palm, supra note 2, at 19 ("The mechanisms and attendant procedures [of
§ 1963(d)] vary depending upon when in the criminal process the government seeks relief.");
Michael L. Sheier, Comment, The Bill of Rights Becomes the Latest Casualty in the War on
Drugs and Organized Crime - Surprisingly, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees is Consistent with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 905, 936
(1991) (interpreting the structure of§ 853 as indicating that "Congress contemplated that the
role and power of the court would change depending on the juncture in the forfeiture
proceeding").
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until the trier of fact finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.89 Of
course, this presumption of innocence does not bar the imposition
of all forms of restraint on the accused or the accused's property
before a conviction. Courts may, for instance, deny bail where the
defendant is deemed to present a serious threat to the safety of the
community.90 But the presumption of innocence does at least indicate that the interests of the accused should merit special consideration before guilt is determined.
Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendant's
property is far greater in the early stages of a prosecution. By the
time of conviction, the defendant has had a full opportunity to
make use of the truth-finding abilities of the adversarial process.
At earlier stages, the defendant has not yet had this full opportunity, and thus the potential for error is much more significant. This
risk is particularly real for the several preconviction proceedings,
such as the imposition of section 1963(d)(2) restraints, that are conducted ex parte.91 For example, in Martin, the government initially
sought the imposition of pretrial restraints on well over fifteen million dollars, but a subsequent indictment alleged that only six
million dollars were tainted.92 Martin demonstrates the kind of
mistakes the government can make in the early stages of a
prosecution.93
The presumption of innocence and the potential for error require that courts exercise caution in imposing on a defendant's assets in pretrial settings, especially because restraining orders are
such powerful weapons.94 Several courts have recognized that the
entry of pretrial restraints may impose great hardship on the accused.95 Restraining orders can deny a defendant access to most or
even all of his assets, and he may require the use of at least a por89. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the presumption of
innocence doctrine. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976} {"The presumption
of innocence .•. is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.");
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 {1895) {"The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
90. See United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739 {1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act of
1984's preventive detention measures against constitutional challenge).
91. One commentator has noted that in a nonadversarial ex parte proceeding, "there is a
substantial risk that the order will erroneously deprive a defendant of his property interests."
King, supra note 2, at 279; cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct.
492, 501 {1993) {"The practice of ex parte seizure ••. creates an unacceptable risk of error.").
92. 1 F.3d 1351, 1354-55 {3d Cir. 1993). The facts of Martin are summarized supra note
14.
93. 1 F.3d at 1354-55.
94. See United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 365 {9th Cir. 1994) (describing the CCE's
pretrial restraint measures as a "drastic remedy").
95. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Thier, 801F.2d1463, 1476 {5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin J., concurring); see also King, supra note 2
at 288 ("A complete pretrial restraint on the means needed to pay ordinary living expenses
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tion of them to provide for the basic necessities of life. Moreover,
pretrial restraints may a1so impose hardships on those individuals
who are :financially dependant on the accused.96 For instance, a
widower with several dependent young children, if subjected to section 1963(d) restraints, might suddenly lack the funds to provide his
children with clothes, food, and medical care.97
The need for greater caution in restraining assets in the early
stages of a prosecution is expressed in RICO's forfeiture section,
for that provision's approach toward a defendant's assets turns on
the phase of the prosecution. In preindictment proceedings, RICO
provides the strongest measures for safeguarding the rights of the
defendant. Courts must satisfy several strict requirements before
entering any form of restraint against potentially forfeitable property.98 If notice to the interested parties and an opportunity for a
hearing are not provided, the court may only impose a temporary
restraining order with a time limit of up to ten days. 99 Moreover,
irreparably imposes the economic impact of forfeiture on the defendant and his dependents
before a trial and conviction have occurred.").
These potential burdens are exacerbated when RICO's pretrial restraint provision is applied to substitute assets. When § 1963(d) restraints are imposed on tainted assets, there is at
least the strong possibility that the defendant and any dependents will be able to rely on
some other form of untainted property to provide for the basic necessities of life. When
courts extend these restraints to all forms of assets, however, the probability that a defendant
will be unable to reach enough of his assets to pay for basic living expenses naturally increases. See Ripinsky, 20 F.3d at 365 (describing the CCE's pretrial restraint measures as a
"drastic remedy," and remarking that to extend subsection {d)'s restraint powers to substitute assets would be "an even more powerful weapon").
96. The defendant facing a RICO prosecution usually has the option to waive bail and
remain in jail, where he will be at least assured of receiving food and shelter. His dependents, however, do not have such an option.
97. Judge Alvin Rubin has described the hardships that may result from the imposition of
pretrial restraining orders. See Thier, 801 F.2d at 1476. In Thier, the defendant challenged
the imposition of a restraining order on several grounds, one of which was the district court's
failure to exempt some assets from restraint so that he could provide for his basic living
expenses. 801 F.2d at 1466. The F1fth Circuit agreed that the trial court should at least have
considered the defendant's need for living expenses. 801 F.2d at 1471. Concurring in the
result, Judge Rubin filed a separate opinion in which he emphasized the potential hardships
that might be imposed by the entry of a restraining order. He noted that if the defendant
"has no money to buy food or to pay for housing, he might waive his right to release on bail
and go to jail, but ... his family would remain stripped of all means of support - without the
option of reporting to jail - though accused of no crime." 801 F.2d at 1476. To Judge
Rubin, this potential result "should shock the judicial conscience at least as much as does the
assertion that the prosecution may pump the stomach of an accused person in order to obtain
evidence." 801 F.2d at 1476.
Furthermore, because RICO's pretrial restraint provision allows for the entry of restraining orders before an indictment, the accused might not even be arrested yet, and thus
not have the option to remain in jail. Of course, preindictment restraining orders are subject
to stringent time limits. See infra notes 99, 105, and accompanying text. Still, the defendant's
inability to use his assets for even a brief period of time may impair his ability to provide for
certain basic necessities.
98. 18 u.s.c. § 1963{d) {1988).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988). This ten-day limit may be extended if good cause is
shown or the affected party consents to further restraints. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{d)(2) (1988).
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the prosecution must show that there is probable cause to believe
that the disputed property would be subject to forfeiture in the
event of a conviction and that notifying the defendant would "jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture."100
If the prosecution desires some action more substantial than a
ten-day temporary restraining order but has not yet filed an indictment or information, it must satisfy an even stricter test. First, notice and an opportunity for a hearing must be provided to the
parties appearing to have an interest in the disputed property.101
Second, the prosecution must establish that there is a "substantial
probability" that the assets would be forfeited and that the failure
to impose restraints immediately would result in the assets being
made unavailable for forfeiture. 102 Third, the court must determine
that the need to preserve the availability of the property outweighs
any hardship on the parties subject to the restraint.103 When these
three requirements are met, a court may enter a restraining order
or injunction, require a performance bond, or take any other action
to preserve the assets.104 Yet even these more substantial actions
are limited in duration, for courts may only impose preindictment
restraining orders for up to ninety days. ms
Once the prosecution has filed an indictment or information
charging the defendant with a RICO violation, these stringent requirements and limitations are lifted.106 The prosecution no longer
needs to demonstrate that there is a substantial probability of ultimate forfeiture and risk of losing the assets or that the need for
restraint is so great that it outweighs any hardship to the affected
parties. Instead, the indictment or information need only allege
that the property sought to be restrained would be subject to forfeiture in the event of conviction.107 Furthermore, unlike preindictment orders, there are no specific time constraints; the restraints
may last as long as necessary. Still, even after an indictment, the
government's power over a defendant's assets is limited to restraint
measures designed to preserve the availability of property for any
ultimate forfeiture. Despite allegations of wrongdoing, the defendant retains his interest in the potentially forfeitable assets.
100. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(2) {1988).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (1988).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(i) (1988).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1988).
104. 18 u.s.c. § 1963(d)(l) (1988).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988). As with subsection (d)(2) restraints, this time limit
may be extended upon a showing of good cause or upon the filing of an indictment or information. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l) (1988).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A) (1988).
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Upon conviction, however, any protection for a defendant's
property completely dissipates.1os The defendant loses all rights to
his tainted assets; such property is automatically forfeited to the
government.109 Moreover, if any portion of these funds are unavailable, the court may order the defendant to make up the difference through the forfeiture of untainted, substitute assets.110
The foregoing analysis shows that with respect to impositions
upon tainted assets, Congress has provided greater procedural protections for defendants at the early stages of a prosecution. It is
entirely consistent, therefore, for Congress to ·provide greater procedural protections for substitute assets during pretrial stages.
B. Congressional Concern About Substitute Assets
As demonstrated in section I.B, RICO treats tainted and substitute assets differently.111 Congress displayed far greater caution in
dealing with substitute assets than with tainted assets: RICO provides that courts may only order the forfeiture of substitute assets
as a "last-resort" measure.112 This more cautious approach makes
sense, given that defendants obtain substitute assets through legitimate activities. Accordingly, the government should not restrain
such property without providing considerable procedural
safeguards.
By contrast, the government may more readily restrain tainted
assets. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 113 the Supreme Court
drew an analogy between tainted assets and robbery proceeds that
helps explain why a defendant has no legitimate possessory interest
in tainted property. In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court held that the
CCE's restraint provision does not impinge upon the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his choice.114 In so holding, the Court compared tainted assets under the CCE to the proceeds of a robbery. The Court stated that a "robbery suspect ...
has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a
bank to retain an attorney," because "[t]he money, though in his
possession, is not rightfully his." 115 Because tainted assets, like the
proceeds of a robbery, are not rightfully in the defendant's posses108. See Scheier, supra note 88, at 936 (concluding that "it is not bold to speculate that
the Congress intended to treat the assets of a convicted criminal different[ly] than the assets
of an accused prior to an adjudication of guilt").
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{a) {1988).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1963{m) {1988).
111. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text
112. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing the safeguards imposed on
dispositions of a defendant's substitute assets).
·
113. 491 U.S. 617 {1989).
114. 491 U.S. at 624-33.
115. 491 U.S. at 626.
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sion, the defendant has no legitimate possessory interest in the assets, and RICO may therefore provide for their restraint before
conviction.
This rationale, however, does not extend to assets which lack a
nexus with the illegal conduct. Substitute assets are acquired in a
legal manner and are not subsequently used to further an illegal
purpose. The defendant therefore should have a legitimate possessory interest in them. Given this legitimate interest, it is logical for
Congress to be concerned about the adverse impact on the defendant whose substitute assets are frozen under RICO's pretrial restraint powers.
The cautious approach required by substitute assets' lack of a
connection with an illegal activity explains why Congress might refuse to authorize the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. The 1986
enactment of a substitute asset provision indicates that Congress
finally decided that the forfeiture of assets that have no nexus with
the RICO offense is a necessary tool in the war against organized
crime. The ultimate forfeiture of such assets is only a postconviction remedy, however, and as discussed above,116 RICO's forfeiture
provisions manifest far less concern with defendant's property interests117 once the trier of fact has determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, even though Congress has decided
that postconviction confiscations of substitute assets are allowable,
it does not necessarily follow that Congress has also concluded that
preconviction impositions are permissible as well. Indeed, because
Congress's legislative efforts with respect to RICO indicate a cautious approach toward both pretrial phases and substitute assets, it
seems consistent for Congress to refuse to give courts the authority
to reach property with no connection to the crime before trial.
CONCLUSION

RICO's forfeiture provisions do not permit the pretrial restraint
of substitute assets. The pretrial restraint provision's explicit reference only to tainted assets indicates that courts do not have the authority to enter restraining orders against substitute assets. In
addition, the legislative history accompanying RICO lacks any clear
expression of contrary intent that would permit courts to ignore the
plain language of the statute. Instead, this history reveals Congress's desire to limit RICO's restraint powers to tainted funds.
Congress also had good reasons not to allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute property. RICO is much more circumspect
116. See supra Part III.A.
117. Often, third-party rights are also implicated by RICO's pretrial restraint measures,
since an innocent third party may claim an interest in the property subject to § 1963(d)
restraints.
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when dealing with both pretrial proceedings and substitute assets
than with postconviction proceedings and tainted assets. Given this
concern about RICO's reach in pretrial phases and with regard to
substitute assets, it does not seem surprising that Congress provided
for the forfeiture of substitute assets upon conviction but balked at
the restraint of such property before trial. Accordingly, when future courts are faced with government requests for the entry of restraining orders against substitute assets, they should decline the
opportunity to stretch an already expansive provision to include all
of a defendant's assets.

